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I. INTRODUCTION

Never underestimate the ability of smart people to do dumb things. In
2006, Hewlett-Packard (H-P), the leading information technology
company, raked in $91.7 billion' and was ranked number 11 by Fortune
500.2 By the end of 2006, the Hewlett-Packard Board of Directors (Board),
a compilation of some of the brightest minds in business, managed to
reduce H-P to just another company whose name became synonymous
with the term "corporate scandal." To be fair, though, H-P's scandal was
not like Enron's or Worldcom's. 3 No one got rich and the company did not
collapse. Instead, Congress hauled in H-P's top brass to explain why the
company's contractors dug through directors' trash, staked out reporters'
homes, and most notably, pried into private phone records, all in what
seemed like a second-rate spy film.
In general, corporate malfeasance invokes the image of top executives
profiting at the expense of shareholders. In the H-P saga, however, the
only real damage was to H-P's public image. Nevertheless, that was
enough to spark a series of shareholder lawsuits alleging that the Board,
along with certain top employees, breached their fiduciary duties owed to
H-P's shareholders. 4
This Note uses the facts of the H-P spy scandal to illustrate the effect
that legal uncertainties have on a board of directors. Traditionally, state
courts set the standards that govern corporate fiduciary duties. However,

1. Hewlett-Packard Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 74 (Dec. 22, 2006), availableat
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 47217/000104746906015253/a2l74889z I 0-k.htm.
2. Fortune 500 Ranking, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/ fortune/fortune500/fill list/ (last
visited May 29, 2007).
3. In 2002, Enron Corp., a large energy supplier, and Worldcom, Inc., a large
telecommunications provider, collapsed amidst a massive accounting fraud that sank the companies
into bankruptcy and sent top executives to prison.
4. Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Gross v. Babbio, No. 2565-N, 2006 WL 3692932
(Del. Ch. filed Nov. 21, 2006); Shareholder Derivative Complaint, The 1199 SEIU Greater New
York Pension Fund v. Dunn, No. 06CV071186, 2006 WL 3616991 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 29,
2006).
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recent developments in federal criminal law and federal securities laws
have imposed varying standards of care inconsistent with state common
law. These inconsistencies produced the legal uncertainty that resulted in
H-P's public relations fiasco. Part II of this Note introduces the facts of the
H-P case. Part III explains the fiduciary duties that directors owe to
shareholders and how federal mandates have muddied the traditional
standards of liability. Part IV describes how the state and federal
inconsistencies forced H-P directors into a necessary pursuit to plug an
elusive media leak. Part V discusses the directors' potential legal liability
in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era. Part VI examines the efficacy of three
proposed solutions that would clarify the current state of confusion in
corporate fiduciary law.
II. THE H-P FACTS: FROM SPIES TO SCANDAL

On January 24, 2005, the Wall Street Journal published an article
extensively detailing an H-P Board private retreat. 5 The front-page story
identified the source only as a person "familiar with the matter."6 In
January 2006, CNET News ran an article outlining sensitive long-term
strategy information discussed in private at another Board retreat.7 The
source, who again remained anonymous, provided distinct details known
only to those in attendance.' Both stories contained publicly inaccessible
information, which a reporter could have obtained only if a director had
granted a peek inside the boardroom.9
A. KONA I
After the Wall Street Journal leak in 2005, Carly Fiorina, the H-P
Chairman and C.E.O. at the time, attempted to plug the leak by hiring an
outside law firm to interview each director in an effort to discover the
source of the news stories.'" Unfortunately, no one confessed, and the

5. Pui-Wing Tam, Hewlett-PackardBoard Considersa Reorganization,WALL ST. J., Jan.
24, 2005, at Al.
6. Id.
7. Dawn Kawamoto & Tom Krazit, HP Outlines Long-Term Strategy, CNETNEWS.COM,
Jan. 23,2006, http://news.com.com/HP+outlines+long-term+strategy/2100-1014_3-6029519.html.
8. Id.
9. David A. Kaplan, Suspicions and Spies in Silicon Valley, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 2006, at
40.
10. UnauthorizedInformationCollection Using "Pretexting."HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigationsofthe H, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. 2 (2006)
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leaker remained at large. Repeated reminders about a director's duty of
confidentiality also proved futile." When Patricia Dunn took the reins as
set out to unmask the3 source,
Chairman of the Board in early 2005, she
12
which she saw as "unfinished business"' from Fiorina's tenure.'
By summer 2005, Dunn had launched the first formal investigation into
the leaks. In this effort, dubbed "Project KONA,"' 4 Dunn commissioned
a private detective firm to investigate the directors. Despite intense efforts,
the first KONA investigation (Kona )ended fruitlessly in the summer of
2005."5 Nonetheless, Dunn hoped that the mere announcement of the
investigation would inhibit further transgressions. 6 The January 2006
CNET News article proved Dunn's hope to be misplaced. 7
B. KONA II
After the January 2006 leak, Dunn launched the second probe, called
"KONA II," but this time she tapped H-P's senior ethics counsel, Kevin
Hunsaker, to assume the helm of the investigation. 8 Ann Baskins, H-P's
General Counsel, and Mark Hurd, H-P's freshly installed C.E.O., both
gave their nod of approval to Dunn.' 9 KONA II proved a success.2 ° In early
2006, a private detective firm unearthed evidence that the culprit was
likely Dr. George A. Keyworth II, a twenty-year veteran of the Board.2 ' In
May 2006, the Board confronted Keyworth and asked him to resign.22 He
refused, which prompted an unleashing of personal vendettas and a clash
that Shakespeare might've
of egos that Newsweek called "a tragicomedy
23
penned had he gotten an M.B.A.,

[hereinafter Testimony] (prepared statement of Patricia Dunn, former Chairman of the Board,
Hewlett-Packard Co.).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. "Kona" is the name of Patricia Dunn's vacation retreat in Hawaii.
15.

Tracking the H-P Controversy, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, http://online.wsj.com/public/

resources/documents/info-hptime0609.html (last visited June 4, 2007).
16. Id.
17. See supra text accompanying note 7.
18. Tracking the H-P Controversy, supra note 15.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 40. Patricia Dunn and Tom Perkins, a former H-P director and
friend of Keyworth, continue to publicly battle over how the leak investigation should have been
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C. The Tragicomedy Unfolds
Discovering that Keyworth was the media source should have been a
cause for celebration by Dunn and the rest of the Board. The investigation
team plugged the leak that provided sensitive company information to two
major news outlets in direct violation of H-P's Standard of Business
Conduct.24 Dunn hoped this would end an era of high tension amidst the
Board, restore mutual trust among its directors, 5 and allow H-P to
function more effectively. 6
Instead, Tom Perkins, an H-P director and good friend of Keyworth,
caused a public uproar when he disclosed that H-P sanctioned private
detectives to do H-P's dirty work. 7 By September 2006, the public outcry
over the KONA I and KONA II tactics forced Dunn, Hunsaker, and
Baskins to resign from H-P. 28 Later that month, the Sub-Committee on
Investigations to the House Energy and Commerce Committee grilled
Dunn, Hurd, and other top H-P employees.29 In October 2006, California's
Attorney General filed criminal charges against Dunn, Hunsaker, and
others involved in the probes.3" The Department of Justice, the Securities

handled. See Tom Perkins, Op-Ed, The ComplianceBoard, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2007, at A14
(blaming Patricia Dunn for trying to force Perkins and Keyworth offthe H-P Board); Patricia Dunn,
Op-Ed, The H-P Investigation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2006, at Al 1 (defending herself from Tom
Perkins's character attacks).
24. Testimony, supra note 10, at 2, 3.
25. George Anders & Alan Murray, BoardroomDuel: Behind H-P Chairman'sFall,Clash
With a PowerfulDirector,WAUL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at Al.
26. Testimony, supra note 10, at 1, 2.
27. Tracking the H-P Controversy, supra note 15. Literally, reports indicate that the
detectives dug through suspects' trash. Pui-Wing Tam, I Spy--A Reporter'sStory: How H-P Kept
Tabs On Mefor a Year, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2006, at Al.
28. Tracking the H-P Controversy, supranote 15.
29. Id.
30. Peter Waldman & Don Clark, CaliforniaChargesDunn, 4 Others in H-PScandal,WALL
ST. J., Oct. 5, 2006, at Al; see also Felony Complaint, State v. Dunn, No. 061027481, 2006 WL
2839785 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 4, 2006) (charging Dunn and others for fraudulent receipt of
private information from a public utility, access of computer data without permission, identity theft,
and conspiracy to commit those crimes). In March 2007, a California judge dropped the charges
against Dunn and was expected to do the same for the other defendants. Matt Richtel, Charges
Dismissedin Hewlett-PackardSpying Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at C1. H-P also agreed to
pay $14.5 million and overhaul its internal governance program as part of a settlement with the
California Attorney General. Christopher Lawton, H-P Settles Civil Charges in 'Pretexting'
Scandal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006, at A3.
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and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission
also began to examine the H-P investigations. 3'
D. The H-P Spy Tactics
The ensuing brouhaha began once the public learned of the KONA
team's use of "pretexting." This practice, long a commonplace
investigative tool, 32 refers to the act of impersonating an individual to
obtain further information about that person.33 Using this technique, the
KONA teams not only accessed phone records of H-P's own directors, but
also private records ofjournalists, including some at the New York Times
and the Wall StreetJournal.34 The California Attorney General alleged that
the detectives used the last four digits of a surveilled reporter's social
security number to obtain her phone records from her service provider.35
In addition to "pretexting," the detectives secretly followed directors and
journalists in the hopes of catching the leaker in the act. 36 They also set up
an e-mail sting operation on a reporter to trick her into revealing her
source, which the KONA II team believed was the transgressor.3 7
E. The ShareholderReaction
Shareholders complained that the use of these tactics was a breach of
the directors' fiduciary duties because their use subjected H-P to
substantial expense and harm to its reputation and goodwill.38 Specifically,
shareholders claim the entire Board breached its fiduciary duties when it
allegedly "participated in and/or failed to oversee or control" the company

31. Damon Darlin, H-P Will Pay $14.5 Million to Settle Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2006, at
C5.
32. John R. Emshwiller, Old Trick. Hewlett-PackardWas FarFromFirstto Try 'Pretexting,'
WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2006, at Al.
33. Margeurite E. Patrick, Lessons Learned:Issues Exposed in the Aftermath of the HewlettPackardDebacle, PRIVACY & DATA PROTECTION LEGAL REP., Oct. 2006. "Pretexting" usually
involves the use of previously known information, such as a birthday or social security number, to
trick the information holder into believing that the impersonator is the legitimate owner of the
information. Id. For example, "pretexting" generally involves a case where A provides misleading
information to B so that A may obtain information that B holds about C, when B is prohibited from
giving that information to A.
34. Kaplan, supra note 9.
35. Pui-Wing Tam, supra note 27.
36. Id.
37. Anders & Murray, supra note 25.
38. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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sufficiently to prevent H-P employees from engaging in illegal activity.3 9
Ironically, the shareholders probably would have alleged the same claims
had the media leak resulted in a securities law violation. Such a violation
would have prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission to bring
an enforcement action, subjecting the company to civil liability. That
result certainly would have triggered shareholder lawsuits similarly
alleging a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties. Thus, the boardroom
leak placed the H-P Board in a classic Catch-22 situation: no matter which
course of action it chose, vigorous pursuit of the leak or passive
ambivalence, the Board would have been exposed to liability.
III. APPLICABLE CORPORATE LAW

Traditionally, state law assumed the lead role in governing
corporations. However, today's directors and officers face increasing legal
pressure from federal criminal and securities laws, which has led to
conflicting legal standards. This conflict created the fear and paranoia that
pushed Dunn and the rest of the Board into this crisis.
A. State CorporateLaw
Directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders arising from the
directors' statutorily defined role as the managers and overseers of a
corporation. 40 However, their specific obligations under those duties derive
from judge-made common law articulated over the years on a case-by-case
basis. 4' The underlying premise of a director's fiduciary duty is the
obligation of the director to advance the interests of the corporation,

39. The 1199 SEIU Greater New York Pension Fund v. Dunn, No. 06CV071186, 2006 WL
3616991 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 29, 2006).
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(a) (2007) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors
.... ); see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) ("A director is a fiduciary." (citing
Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 588 (1875))); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b)

(1984) ("[T]he business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction,
and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors .... ").
41. E. Norman Veasey& Christine T. DiGuglielmo, What Happened in DelawareCorporate
Law and Governancefrom 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA.

L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2005) (noting that state common law forms the principles of fiduciary duties
on a case-by-case basis). Veasey was previously Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court.
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despite any personal interest to the contrary.4 2 Thus, a director is dutybound to sublimate his own interests to that of the corporation.
Because nearly 60% of all Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in
Delaware, the state's judicial decisions provide the vanguard of corporate
law that other jurisdictions follow. 43 Over the years, Delaware courts have
produced two constant duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. A
corporation may hold its directors liable for a breach of either of these
duties. The duty of loyalty obligates a director to put the corporation's
interests over that of his own.' In other words, a director may not usurp
a corporate opportunity, 45 engage in self-dealing transactions that harm the
corporation,' or generally engage in activities that further a personal
interest at the expense of the corporation.47
The duty of care demands that directors act with prudence when
exercising their decision-making and supervisory functions.48 Courts
established the "business judgment rule" to afford a level of deference to
directors' decisions so that they may carry out their managerial role
without judicial second-guessing.49 The rule itself is a "presumption that
in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company."50 Unless that presumption is
rebutted by shareholders, a court will not substitute its own judgment for
that of the board's if the board's decision can be "attributed to any rational
business purpose. '"'

42. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (noting that transactions
between a fiduciary and the corporation, which tend to produce a conflict of interest, are examined
with the most scrupulous care and are viewed "'with jealousy by the courts."') (quoting Globe
Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 490 (N.Y. 1918)).
43. State of Delaware: Division of Corporations, http://www.corp.delaware.gov/default.
shtml (last visited June 4, 2007).
44. Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154 (Del. 1996).
45. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939) (holding that a corporate officer or
director may not seize an opportunity that the corporation could reasonably be expected to take).
46. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,720 (Del. 1971) (holding that self-dealing
occurs when a parent corporation is on both sides of a transaction with its subsidiary and the parent
receives something to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the subsidiary's minority shareholders).
47. See supra text accompanying note 42.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
49. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (noting that
the "business judgment rule" recognizes the statutory authority for directors to manage a
corporation (citing MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003))).
50. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
51. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (quoting Sinclair
Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720).
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1. Van Gorkom and the Duty of Care
To decide whether a director breached the duty of care, judicial review
focuses on the process of a decision, not on its substance. 2 In the classic
case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held directors
personally liable because they approved a cash-out merger in a process
that the Van Gorkom court deemed "grossly negligent."53 The Van Gorkom
court found that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care because
they failed to inform themselves of all reasonably available and relevant
information. 4 Corporate law commentators heavily criticized the Van
Gorkom decision for its punishment of directors, but the Delaware
Supreme Court lets it stand. Delaware courts still apply a gross negligence
standard to determine whether a business decision was informed and
included consideration of all reasonably available information."
2. The "Duty of Caremark"
More recent developments in corporate law place an increasing focus
on a director's duty to oversee or monitor the corporation. In this context,
directors may be liable not just for a decision they made, but also for a
decision they should have made. Simply put, a director may be liable in
circumstances where a corporation suffers legal harm that could have been
prevented had the director not been asleep at the wheel.
Liability for failing to monitor the corporation began to gain traction
56 which has stoked fear in
with the 1996 landmark case, In re Caremark,
boardrooms ever since. This new subset within the duties of loyalty and
care, 57 which I call the "Duty of Caremark," provides the theory of
liability upon which the H-P shareholders rest their hope of recovery. The
H-P directors defend themselves by claiming they were unaware of any

52. See infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
53. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). Other Delaware judges disagree
that the Delaware Supreme Court applied a true gross negligence standard, but instead applied a
higher standard of care. See Allen et al., infra note 78. Nonetheless, Delaware courts use "gross
negligence" as the standard in the duty of care context. Id.
54. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
55. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000) (applying a "gross negligence"
standard to determine whether directors breached their duty of care).
56. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968-69 (Del. Ch. 1996).
57. Until November 2006, commentators generally placed a director's duty to monitor as a
subset of the duty of care. However, the Delaware Supreme Court declared that a failure to monitor
the corporation may establish a lack of good faith, which provides the necessary condition for
liability under the duty of loyalty. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006).
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illegal methods used by the detectives.58 The H-P shareholders contend,
based on this "Duty of Caremark," that the directors should have known
and should have prevented the use of such legally dubious spy tactics.59
The Caremark court considered the legal standard that governed a
board's obligation to monitor the corporation.6" Caremark was a health
care provider with about seven-thousand employees and ninety branch
operations.6 1 In 1991, the Health and Human Services Office of the
Inspector General commenced an investigation into the company's
suspected violations of the Anti-Referral Payments Law (ARLP), which
prohibited health care providers from paying any compensation to induce
the referral of Medicare or Medicaid patients (i.e., kickbacks). 2
Ultimately, a federal grand jury indicted Caremark, two of its officers, and
two other individuals for violating the ARLP.63 Caremark settled with the
government agencies and paid a criminal fine and substantial civil
penalties.'
The shareholders brought a derivative suit against the individual
directors for the monetary loss resulting from the settlement. 65 The
shareholders alleged that the Caremark directors breached their duty of
care by failing to adequately supervise Caremark's employees. 66 The
shareholders argued that the directors' failure to prevent its employees'
illegal activity exposed Caremark to significant liability, which could have
been prevented with proper oversight. 67 Eventually, Caremark and the
plaintiffs settled the case.

58. See Testimony, supra note 10, at 5; see also Dunn, supra note 23 ("Throughout the
process I asked and was assured-by both H-P's internal security department and the company's
top lawyers, both verbally and in writing-that the work being undertaken to investigate and
discover these leaks was legal, proper and consistent with the H-P way of performing
investigations.").
59. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
60. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961.
61. Id. at 961-62.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 963-64.
64. Id. at 965. By the time Caremark settled, the investigation grew to include the Department
of Justice, the U.S. Veterans Administration, the U.S. Federal Employee Health Benefits Program,
Federal Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services, and related state agencies
in every state. Id. at 965. As part of sentencing, the government stipulated that "no senior executive
of Caremark participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of wrongdoing in connection with
the home infusion business practices." Id. at 965. The settlements required Caremark to pay
approximately $250 million. Id. at 961.
65. Caremark,698 A.2d at 961.
66. Id. at 964.
67. Id.
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The issue facing the Caremark court was whether the settlement
between the company and the shareholders was fair and reasonable.68 In
finding that it was, the court considered the strength of the parties'
positions. 69 Chancellor Allen, the pen behind Caremark, embraced the
opportunity to assess the shareholders' central theory of liability, which
required an evaluation of a director's obligation to monitor corporate
performance.7 ° The court distinguished between two separate contexts that
may result in liability for a director's failure to monitor. First, liability may
follow from a board decision that was ill-advised or grossly negligent, as
the Van Gorkom board learned.7 Second, liability "may be said to arise
from an unconsideredfailureof the boardto act in circumstances in which
due attention would, arguably, have prevented the lOss."72 In other words,
a board may be liable for doing nothing when it could have prevented a
loss to the company.7 3 The H-P shareholders allege liability under this
latter context. They claim that the Board failed to ask the necessary
questions while possibly illegal activity occurred within its purview.7 4
To establish what became known as a Caremark complaint, a
shareholder plaintiff must show either "(1) that the directors knew or (2)
should have known that violations of law were occurring and, in either
event, (3) that the directors took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent
or remedy that situation, and (4) that such failure proximately resulted in
the losses complained of. . .

68. Id. at 961.
69. Id.
70. Caremark,698 A.2d at 961.
71. Id. at 967. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,893 (Del. 1985); see also supra text
accompanying notes 53-55. This first context described in Caremarkrefers to the process-based
analysis used in Van Gorkom. As long as the process employed in making the decision was either
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests, it is irrelevant whether
a fact-finder believes the decision was "substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending
through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irrational." Caremark,698 A.2d at 967. Also, the Caremark
court used the word "negligent" as a standard to find liability in a board decision, but the standard
is "grossly negligent." See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000) (applying a "gross
negligence" standard to determine whether directors breached their duty of care).
72. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
73. A deliberate decision to do nothing, as opposed to an unconsidered failure to act, would
fall under the first context of liability, not the second. The second context is meant to encompass
situations where the board is unaware of employee activity that could expose the company to
liability.
74. See supratext accompanying note 4. The use of the phrase "possibly illegal" is deliberate
here because "pretexting" laws at the time were vague, and whether the detectives actually
committed any crimes remains uncertain.
75. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
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The Caremarkcourt used this test to impose an affirmative obligation
on directors to assure their company has an adequate information and
reporting system.76 This reporting system is undoubtedly a worthy goal of
good corporate governance, and Caremark seemingly transformed this
goal into an affirmative duty. However, the Caremark court set the
standard for this duty so low that even the court itself recognized that it
may be the most difficult theory in corporate law upon which a plaintiff
might prevail." To establish liability for a director's failure to monitor, a
plaintiff must show a "sustained or systematic failure of the board to
exercise oversight."78
Caremarkbegan to take on a "life of its own,"' as E. Norman Veasey,
former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, remarked. After the
decision, shareholders routinely asserted Caremarkclaims in an effort to
capitalize on this new avenue of recovery. Nonetheless, as Chancellor
Allen predicted, shareholders faced an uphill battle in this effort."
However, prevailing on a Caremarkclaim is not impossible.

76. Id. at 970.
77. Id. at 967.
78. Id. at 971. The affirmative duty requires an attempt in good faith to reach this worthy
goal, but a director breaches this duty only when there is a sustained or systematic failure to
exercise reasonable oversight, such as when there is "an utter failure to attempt" to put a reporting
system in place. Id. A director has a duty to attempt to achieve greatness, but breaches that duty
only upon a continuous and methodical failure to try. In a subsequent article by Chancellor Allen,
Vice Chancellor (and later Delaware Supreme Court Justice) Jack B. Jacobs, and Vice Chancellor
Leo E. Strine, Jr., the three judges supported this divergence, even as they simultaneously raised
the expectation of directors "as a normative matter." William T. Allen et al., Realigning the
StandardofReview ofDirectorDue Care with DelawarePublicPolicy: A CritiqueofVan Gorkom
and its Progenyas a StandardofReview Problem,96 Nw. U. L. REV. 449,449 (2002). The judges'
view is consistent with Delaware cases that distinguish between the concepts of good corporate
governance and the law of corporate fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256
(Del. 2000). See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
StandardsofReview in CorporateLaw, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437,437-38 (1993) (explaining how
and why standards of conduct and standards of review diverge in corporate law).
79. Veasey & DiGuglielmo, supranote 41, at 1437.
80. See In Re Cray, Inc. Derivative Litig., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1124 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
(citing Caremarkfor the proposition that even if an employee's crime caused the corporation harm,
it is not necessarily enough to constitute a breach of duty); Sachs v. Sprague, 401 F. Supp. 2d 159,
170 (D. Mass. 2005) (granting the defendant corporation's motion to dismiss because shareholders
failed to adequately plead a Caremark claim); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch.
2003) (granting the defendant corporation's motion to dismiss by construing Caremarkto require
a "showing that the directors were conscious of the fact that they were not doing their jobs.").
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3. In re Abbott
In In re Abbott, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
applied Illinois law and used Caremarkto hold directors liable for their
failure to monitor the corporation.8 In Abbott, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) sent a series of warnings to various executives and
directors at Abbott Laboratories (Abbott) notifying the company that it
was violating FDA regulations in several of its manufacturing plants.82 The
FDA filed a complaint for injunctive relief after six years of sending
unheeded warnings. 3 Abbott signed a consent decree that required the
company to pay a $100 million civil penalty." In addition, the consent
decree ordered Abbott to destroy certain products, which resulted in a loss
of approximately $250 million in annual revenue.
Naturally, Abbott shareholders brought a derivative suit and asserted
that Abbott directors breached their fiduciary duty to monitor the
company-a classic Caremarkclaim. 6 In Abbott's motion to dismiss, the
court faced the question of whether the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a
claim that the directors breached their duty. 7 The Abbott court factually
distinguished Caremark because the defendants in Abbott were not
"blamelessly unaware" of the activity. 8 In Caremark, the directors
allegedly "ought to have known" 9 of the legal violations, but in Abbott, the
directors actually knew of them because the FDA sent warning letters
directly to top company executives and to the Chairman of the Board. The
Abbott court found that the directors decided no action was required,
placing the Abbott case into the first context of liability discussed in
Caremark.9" The Abbott court then used the Caremarkanalysis to hold that
under the shareholders' alleged facts the directors breached their duty of
oversight." The Abbott court found that the decision not to take any steps
to prevent or remedy the FDA violations may have constituted a

81. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 805-07 (7th Cir. 2003).
82. Id.at 799. The FDA's district director sent certified warning letters to the President of
Abbott and to the Chairman of the Board explicitly stating that a failure to correct the deviations
may result in regulatory action. Id.
83. Id.at 801.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Abbott, 325 F.3d at 802.
87. Id. at 798.
88. Id.at 805 (citing In re Caremark Int'l., Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (quoting Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963))).
89. Caremark,698 A.2d at 969.
90. See supratext accompanying notes 70-73.
91. Abbott, 325 F.3d at 808-09.
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"sustained and systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight," 92 and
denied Abbott's motion to dismiss. 93 Together, Caremark and Abbott
establish that, whether the board decides not to act or ignorantly fails to
act, the directors may be liable for breaching their duty to monitor the
corporation.
B. FederalCriminalLaw: Sentencing Guidelines

Federal mandates placed upon a corporation's board of directors help
create the confusion and uncertainty prevalent in today's boardrooms. In
1991, the U.S. Sentencing Commission adopted The Federal
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), which provide a
federal incentive to ensure that a company ferrets out wrongdoing. 94 The
Guidelines allow judges to mitigate a corporation's criminal sentence
based upon its demonstrated efforts to comply with the law. For example,
a court may reduce a company's monetary penalty if it had a program to
detect legal violations and took steps to report any offenses to appropriate
authorities. 95 While the states traditionally set the law of fiduciary duty,
92. Id. at 809 (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971).
Given the extensive paper trail in Abbott concerning the violations and the inferred
awareness of the problems, the facts support a reasonable assumption that there
was a "sustained and systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight," in this
case intentional in that the directors knew of the violations of law, took no steps
in an effort to prevent or remedy the situation, and that failure to take any
action.., resulted in substantial corporate losses, establishing a lack of good faith.
Id.
93. Id. at 811. Abbott actually misapplied Caremarkwhen it failed to apply the business
judgment rule to the directors' decision not to act. Caremarkstates that board decisions, including
a decision not to act, "will typically be subject to review under the director-protective business
judgment rule .... ." Caremark,698 A.2d at 967. The Abbott court meshes the two contexts of
liability discussed in Caremark.Seesupratext accompanying notes 70-73; Abbott, 325 F.3d at 80809 (subjecting a deliberate business decision to the "sustained and systematic failure" standard that
Caremarkapplied only in the second context). See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del.
1984) ("[A] conscious decision to refrain from acting may nonetheless be a valid exercise of
business judgment and enjoy the protections of the rule."); Mark J. Lowenstein, The Quiet
Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353, 373 (2004) (arguing that Abbott
incorrectly used the Caremarkanalysis).
94. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, 18 U.S.C. Appx § 8B2.1 (Supp. V 2006). One factor
that may mitigate an organization's punishment is the existence of an effective compliance and
ethics program. Id. § 8B2.1(a).
95. See H. Lowell Brown, The CorporateDirector'sCompliance Oversight Responsibility
in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1, 85 (2001) (describing the Guidelines' effect on
corporate incentives); Lisa M. Fairfax, Symposium Enron and Its Aftermath: The Sarbanes-Oxley
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Caremark cited the Guidelines to highlight the "powerful incentives 96
offered by federal criminal law. 97 Caremark'spartial reliance on these
incentives illustrates how additional federal pressure affects the states'
common law governance of fiduciary duties.
C. FederalSecurities Laws
Recent developments in federal securities laws further diminish the
state's central role in governing corporations. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley), 98 the congressional response to a spate of
corporate scandals around 2002, imposes a higher standard of care upon
directors to account as corporate overseers. 99 For example, Sarbanes-Oxley
section 301 requires the audit committee of a board of directors to
establish procedures for the treatment of employee complaints and
concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.'00
Similarly, Sarbanes-Oxley section 302 mandates the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules requiring executive and
financial officers to certify that they have evaluated, and are responsible
for, internal controls designed to ensure that material information about the
company is made known to them.'0 ' These requirements significantly
expand upon a director's obligations under Delaware's common law. As
Caremarkstates, Delaware requires only that a director make a good faith
02
attempt to install internal controls and in no way requires their reporting.
Under state law, the chief executive and financial officer may delegate the
task of overseeing the company's legal compliance (as long as they satisfy
their "Duty of Caremark"in the delegation), but Sarbanes-Oxley requires

Act as Confirmation ofRecent Trends in DirectorandOfficer FiduciaryObligations,76 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 953,969 (2002) (explaining how the Guidelines create incentives for managers to perform
their duty).
96. Caremark,698 A.2d at 969.
97. Id. See also Lowenstein, supranote 93, at 385 (arguing that the states have abdicated
their traditional role of defining the internal affairs of publicly-held corporations).
98. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 [hereinafter SarbanesOxley Act] (codified in scattered sections of I U.S.C.A., 15 U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., 28 U.S.C.A.,
29 U.S.C.A.).
99. See generally Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard of
Care and the Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 Wyo. L. REv. 481, 505 (2006) (noting the
consensus that Sarbanes-Oxley is indicative of a trend towards higher standards of care).
100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l(m)(4) (West 2007).
101. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241(a)(4) (West 2007).
102. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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those executives to personally certify0 3 that they have evaluated the
effectiveness of those internal controls.1
Because Sarbanes-Oxley articulates minimum standards required for
a reasonable information reporting system,t ° a sustained or systematic
failure to satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley's floor of requirements would be
inextricably linked to Caremark liability.'0 5 In effect, a failure to satisfy
those requirements would provide the basis for a breach of the Caremark
duty to monitor. Thus, Caremark liability could be governed by federal
law.
The federal meddling with states' governance of fiduciary law is
raising the standard of care required from directors even in areas that
federal law does not apply.0 6 Just as a rising tide lifts all boats, federal
pressure in specific aspects of corporate governance elevates the duty of
care across the entire realm of corporate law.'07
In addition, the distinction between federal and state law becomes even
more blurred as federal law enforcers increasingly rely on state standards
of liability. In 2003, the SEC filed a complaint against a director alleging
that he "recklessly signed a number of financial statements that were

103. Burch, supranote 99, at 507 (explaining that Securities Exchange Act Rule 1OA-b(3),
which requires an audit committee of the Board of Directors to establish complaint procedures,
directly overrides Delaware common law). See also William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Views From the Beach: The New Federalismof the American Corporate Governance System:
PreliminaryReflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 973-80
(2003) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley's rule-based form is in direct conflict with Delaware's
preference to provide broad boardroom flexibility).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
105. E. Norman Veasey, the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, expressed
this exact concern. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, State-FederalTension in CorporateGovernance
and the ProfessionalResponsibilitiesof Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 446 (2003) ("[T]he utter
failure to follow the minimum expectations of the evolving standards of director conduct, the
minimum expectations of Sarbanes-Oxley... might... raise a good faith issue."); see also Burch,
supra note 99, at 527-29 (noting that state courts may find it difficult to ignore a plaintiff's
argument that a director breached a fiduciary duty by not complying with Sarbanes-Oxley).
106. Edward L. Rubin, Images of Organizations and Consequences of Regulation, 6
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 347, 381-83 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/til/
default/vol6/iss2/art4 (last visited June 4, 2007) (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley is likely to amplify
the tendency to be overcautious for officers and directors who are responsible for monitoring
fraudulent activity).
107. Id.; see also David Rosenberg, GalacticStupidity and the Business Judgment Rule, 32
IOWA J. CORP. L. 301,304 (2007) (arguing that recent Delaware decisions leave open the possibility
for judges to review the substance of a director's decision, not just the process employed).
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materially misleading and took no care to ensure their accuracy.' ' 10 8 In an
interview, Stephen Cutler, the Director of the SEC's Division of
Enforcement, noted the agency's newfound willingness to pursue directors
"who were reckless in their oversight of management and asleep at the
switch."'0 9 In essence, the SEC asserted a Caremark claim."' After
Sarbanes-Oxley, federal statutory law and state common law have been
merging together to a point where the state common law standard of
liability is rising to the federal level. However, state courts have not
expressly approved of this effect, which leaves directors today in the same
state of uncertainty that bedeviled the H-P Board.
IV.FEAR IN THE H-P BOARDROOM: WHY THE LEAK INVESTIGATIONS
WERE NECESSARY

As directors become increasingly easy targets under both federal and
state law, no one should be surprised that the H-P Board acted as it did. HP directors had little choice but to initiate what ultimately became a witchhunt for the leaker. The erosion ofjudicial deference to directors from Van
Gorkom to Caremarkto Sarbanes-Oxley must have left an aura of fear and
uncertainty in the H-P boardroom while the elusive media source remained
at large. After all, none of the directors objected when they learned that an
investigation
was underway. In fact, they each ostensibly encouraged its
1
success." I
When George A. Keyworth II leaked confidential information, he
directly violated H-P's Standards of Business Conduct." 2 More
importantly, his conduct exposed H-P to serious violations of securities
laws, which could lead to the type of civil and criminal penalties that
haunted the boards in CaremarkandAbbott."3 Arguably, the second major
108. Complaint, SEC v. Chancellor Corp., No. 03-10762 MEL., 2003 WL 23885225 (D. Mass.
filed Apr. 24, 2003).
109. Otis Bilodeau, SEC to Go After DirectorsWho IgnoreFraud,CHI.SUN-TIMEs, Aug. 21,
2003, at 51 (emphasis added).
110. In settlement, the SEC permanently barred the defendant from acting as an officer or
director of a publicly held company. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Litigation, SEC
Settles Civil Action with Former Massachusetts Company's President, Outside Director and
Auditors, Release No. 19177 (Apr. 11, 2005).
111. Dunn, supra note 23.
112. HP Standards of Business Conduct Rules 8.1-8.3, 8.5 (rev. Apr. 2005),
http://h41111.www4.hp.com/globalcitizenship/uk/en/pdf/sbcbrochure.pdf; see also Testimony,
supra note 10, at 3.
113. See Simon Rodell, Note, Plumbing in the Boardroom: Plugging Boardroom Leaks
Through a Good Faith Duty of Confidentiality, 59 FLA. L. REv. 631, 633-34, 658-64 (2007)
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leak to CNET News affected H-P's stock price. 1 4 Imagine the
shareholders' response if the SEC had launched an enforcement action
against the company because the directors sat idly by as confidential
information consistently seeped from within private discussions.
Undoubtedly, shareholders would have brought a derivative suit just like
the shareholders in Caremarkand Abbott.
Had the Board watched one leak after another and decided not to act,
that decision would seem strikingly similar to Abbott's decision not to
heed the FDA warnings." 5 As in Abbott, the H-P directors saw the "red
flags"116 raised when they learned of the leak. When illegal activity within
a company raises "red flags" and the board fails to respond accordingly,
liability will almost certainly follow." 7 Thus, if the Board had done
nothing after learning of a fellow director's breach of his duty of
confidentiality," 8 its liability would have followed that of the board in
Abbott. A court would find that the H-P Board took "no steps in a good
faith effort to prevent or remedy [the] situation.""' 9 As the Abbott court
reiterated, that failure to remedy potentially harmful situations constitutes
the "sustained and systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight
"9120

The H-P Board had good reason to worry that a failure to stop the leak
could induce shareholders to haul the company into the courtroom. Patricia
Dunn aptly noted in her testimony before Congress, "had undisciplined
communications with the press continued and a major violation of
securities regulations ensued, H-P's Chairman would have been justifiably
criticized by the Board and beyond for not having taken [the directors']
concerns seriously enough.' 2' Dunn told Congress that the leaks touched
on the most sensitive matters to the company, including the Board's
(arguing in favor of establishing a duty of confidentiality and that George Keyworth would have
breached that duty when he leaked boardroom confidences to the press). Rodell's note correctly
emphasizes the often forgotten point that the true instigator to the H-P scandal was Keyworth, not
Dunn or anyone else on the H-P Board.
114. Testimony, supra note 10, at 2.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
116. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 802 (7th Cir. 2003).
117. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006).
118. See Rodell, supra note 113.
119. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
120. Abbott, 325 F.3d at 809 (quoting Caremark,698 A.2d at 971). Even though the Abbott
court incorrectly applied Caremark, the H-P Board would still be liable in this context because the
business judgment rule does not protect knowing violations of law. See supratext accompanying
note 93; Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing Roth v. Robertson,
118 N.Y.S. 351 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909)).
121. Testimony, supra note 10, at 2.
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discussion about H-P's then C.E.O., prospective C.E.O. candidates, how
the company should be organized, and which officers should hold what
responsibilities. 122
Dunn was not the only Chairman of H-P's Board to fervently believe
the leaks needed to stop. Carly Fiorina, Dunn's predecessor, attempted to
stop the leak by requiring director interviews with outside counsel.
Obviously, repeated reminders to directors about their duty of
confidentiality did little to prevent the leaks. If true, the most revealing
picture of the Board's difficulty came after the investigators concluded
that Keyworth was the likely culprit. Dunn, Baskins, and Mark Hurd were
enjoying a drink together when they noticed Keyworth at the bar. Hurd
approached and told Keyworth that they had unmasked the leaker. After
waiting for Keyworth to confess, Hurd recounts, "He looked me straight
in the eye and didn't say a word ....
V. Is DUNN DONE?: How HER ACTIONS MEASURE UP POST SARBANESOXLEY

The shareholder complaints center around Dunn's alleged wrongdoing
in her oversight of the leak probes.' 24 When Patricia Dunn took over as the
new Chairman of the Board, she sought to fulfill her mandate to stop the
leaks by consulting with fellow director Bob Wayman. 25 Wayman referred
Dunn to Kevin Huska, the head of H-P's Global Security, whom Dunn
consulted in early 2005 to initiate the first investigation. Huska referred
Dunn to Ron DeLia and his outside private investigation firm, Security
Outsourcing Solutions. 26 When the second leak prompted Dunn to restart
the investigation Dunn wanted Kroll Associates, a leading corporate
intelligence agency, to take the lead. Nonetheless, she yielded to Ann
Baskins's recommendation that the investigation continue in-house, but
this time under the direction of Kevin Hunsaker, a senior ethics attorney
in H-P's legal department. 27 In KONA II, Dunn assumed a more active
role. She required Hunsaker to report to her and Baskins each week, 28 and

122. Id.
123. James B. Stewart, The Kona Files, NEW YORKER, FEB. 19, 2007, at 152. Dunn and
Baskins corroborate Hurd's account of this event, but Keyworth disputes it.
124. See supra text accompanying note 4.
125. Testimony, supra note 10, at 3.
126. Id. at4.
127. Stewart, supranote 123.
128. Id.
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according
to H-P's Form 8-K, "Ms. Dunn worked directly with Ron
129
DeLia."
Dunn knew the KONA team accessed phone records, but she told
Congress she had the "clear impression ... from Mr. Delia... that such
records could be obtained from publicly available sources in a legal and
appropriate manner... ."30 Dunn assumed that because attorneys were
overseeing the investigation, they were handling it legally. 3 ' Dunn claims
that she also received assurance from Baskins and Hunsaker that the
investigation
complied with the law and H-P's Standard of Business
2
Conduct.
The underlying issue in this context is whether Patricia Dunn and the
other directors breached their "Duty of Caremark"by allowing detectives
to use questionable investigative tactics. The same Caremarkanalysis that
produced the necessity to act, as described above, also applies to the
directors' oversight of the leak investigations. If Dunn knew that violations
of law were occurring and did not attempt to stop them, then she would
suffer the same fate as the Abbott board and be liable under Caremark.If
she did not know, then the question becomes whether she breached her
duty to monitor by not inquiring deeper into the legality of the tactics. The
other directors face the same exact question, and the same Caremarktest
must apply to them.
Determining whether the directors breached their "Duty of Caremark"
becomes nearly impossible now that the federal law blurs the standard of
liability. How many questions did Dunn need to ask? How far did the law
require her to probe before she was satisfied that the tactics passed legal
muster? Was her reliance on Baskins, the General Counsel, and Hunsaker,
the top ethics attorney, misplaced and insufficient? If so, then whose
opinion would have sufficed?
If a court applied the standard articulated in Caremark, it would be
hard-pressed to support a finding of a "sustained or systematic failure of
the board to exercise oversight."' 33 The mere act of asking Baskins and
Hunsaker whether the tactics were legal is sufficient to exceed this low
standard as long as she relied upon that advice reasonably and in good

129. Hewlett-Packard Co., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Sept. 22, 2006), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ data/47217/000110465906063490/a06-20344 18k.htm.
130. Testimony, supra note 10, at 5.
131. Id.
132. Dunn, supranote 23, at Al.
133. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).

2007)
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faith.' 34 However, identifying how a court would view such behavior in a
post Sarbanes-Oxley era becomes impossible. A court might hold Dunn
liable by applying logic extracted from Sarbanes-Oxley's section 302
requirement that corporate officers certify an evaluation of the company's
internal controls. 35 Because that Sarbanes-Oxley requirement holds
officers accountable for the acts of subordinates, that same logic could be
extended to find Dunn liable for the acts of Hunsaker and DeLia. Such a
finding would hold Dunn to a higher standard of accountability than she
would otherwise be held to under Delaware law. Conflicting standards
between a federal statute and a common law judicial decision create this
fiduciary black hole in which the state demands one thing from a director
while the federal government demands another.
VI. ESCAPING THE BLACK HOLE: SOLUTIONS TO CLARIFY THE LAW

The simple solution for directors would be to comply with the higher
standard of care to avoid placing themselves within the gap between state
and federal requirements. This solution works when a federal statute is on
point, but a director's fiduciary duty expands well beyond specific federal
statutory requirements. For example, the Van Gorkom board did not
struggle with a conflict between federal and state requirements. 3 6 The Van
Gorkom court applied a gross negligence standard to the directors'
decisions,' which can be clarified only through the development of
common law. 3 No federal statute was on point to articulate a standard to
which the directors could have adhered to satisfy their duty of care.
Failing to clarify the muddied nature of a director's duty of oversight
will curtail an individual's willingness to serve as a director-a concern

134. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2007); see also Rattner v. Bidzos, No. 19700, 2003 WL
22284323, at * 12 (Del. Ch.2003) ("[I]n order to hold the directors liable, [a] plaintiff will have to
demonstrate that they were grossly negligent in failing to supervise these subordinates" (quoting
Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1355 (Del. Ch. 1995))).
135. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. 7241 (a)(4) (West 2007). See supratext
accompanying note 101.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
138. See Allen et al., supra note 78, at 449-50. The article illustrates how the common law
produces varying degrees of understanding within the same standard. These esteemed Delaware
judges disagree that the Delaware Supreme Court applied a "gross negligence" standard in Van
Gorkom. Commentators may argue that this produces inconsistency, but over time this
disagreement is beneficial to the development of the standard because a case-by-case application
flushes out the inconsistencies by clarifying the standard.
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that Delaware judges view with paramount importance.'39 Even the
Caremark court warned of such an effect. 40 The sight of Dunn and the rest
of the H-P Board defending against substantial civil penalties raises doubts
among directors as to whether serving in such capacity reaps benefits
beyond the risks.
As is often the case in law, no magic cure exists to solve this problem.
Several solutions might help address the issue, but each has accompanying
drawbacks. The three following solutions would each clarify a director's
obligations within the duty of care, but only the third solution to
compartmentalize the duties outweighs its disadvantages.
A. Dunn 's Suggestion: A New FederalAgency
In her testimony, Dunn urged Congress to consider legislation that
gives companies "legitimate and sanctioned ways of pursuing their
responsibilities to protect their intellectual property and confidentiality.''
One example she provided is a law enforcement agency that companies
could turn to obtain legal backing before pursuing an investigation. 142 She
did not elaborate further, but her suggestion raises an interesting
possibility. A federal agency could be created to issue no-action letters or
private rulings in the same fashion as the SEC or IRS.' 4 3 Companies could
seek a legal opinion from this agency before pursuing a course of action
that may raise legal concerns. Dunn believes that had such an agency
existed, the H-P Board could have inquired how to legally investigate the
unauthorized disclosure of boardroom-confidences.'"
At first glance, this solution provides a reasonable response to a
difficult problem. Despite its good intentions, however, a private ruling
from such an agency would essentially strip the cause of action from a
corporation's shareholders, effectively reducing shareholder control over
the corporation. The shareholders own the corporation, elect its directors,
and presumably hold the directors accountable when they fail to live up to
the shareholders' expectations.

139. See id.
140. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del Ch. 1996) ("[A]
demanding test of liability in the oversight context is probably beneficial to corporate
shareholders... since it makes board service by qualified persons more likely.. .
141. Testimony, supra note 10, at 11.
142. Id.
143. See generally U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: No Action Letters (modified
Mar. 5, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/ answers/noaction.htm.
144. Testimony, supra note 10, at 11.
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A no-action letter from the SEC indicates only that the SEC will not
pursue an enforcement action, but it is silent as to any cause of action by
another potential plaintiff. To synchronize that system with Dunn's
suggestion would require a federal agency with authority to enforce
breaches of fiduciary duties. That is a wildly extreme idea. A director owes
a fiduciary duty to the shareholder, which provides the shareholder the
right to sue in the first place.'45
Both shareholders and directors would reject this suggestion.
Shareholders would lose power to hold their directors accountable, and
directors would face additional federal liability. Even if this proposed
agency had no enforcement power, a legal opinion that condones a board's
action would cripple the shareholders' ability to enforce the duties owed
to them. Any time a shareholder wants to challenge a board's action, the
board can defend itself with this agency's legal opinion. The overall effect
would be an agency that reduces the power of the very individuals it would
be trying to help.
B. If You Can'tBeat Em '-JoinEm ':Raise the Standardto the
FederalLevel
The Delaware Supreme Court could reduce the uncertainty pervading
today's boardrooms by raising the common law standard of care to match
federal requirements. This solution would reduce tension between federal
and state obligations and eliminate the fiduciary black hole that exists
between Caremark's"utter failure"' 46 standard and Sarbanes-Oxley's strict
reporting requirements.'47
The Achilles' heel of this solution is the adverse effect that raising the
standard will have on a director's willingness to serve. Raising the
standard of care subjects directors to additional liability and produces an
unwillingness to face that added risk. Public policy weighs in favor of a
more lenient standard of review because it encourages directors to act
without undue inhibition despite their reduced accountability. 4 ' Raising
the standard of care would produce better director oversight, but an
increased fear of liability will drive directors to avoid decisions that
contain inherent risks. When directors avoid activities that involve some
necessary level of risk, the shareholders bear the greatest loss. As the
145. See generally Rales v. Blasbard, 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993) (noting that shareholder
derivative suits are frequently used as a means of redressing harm to the corporation resulting from
misconduct by its directors).
146. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
148. Allen et al., supra note 78, at 449-50.
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Chancellor who penned Caremarkargued, increased liability derived from
decisions inconsistent with public policy affect director behavior in
unintended and undesirable ways. a9 The effect of this solution would be
similar to the first solution. Raising the standard would intend to benefit
shareholders by requiring greater care from their directors, but the final
result would be greater harm to those that this solution seeks to protect.
C. Separateand Not Equal: Compartmentalizethe Duties
The final alternative is that the Delaware Supreme Court should restate
and reaffirm the historical standards of liability in the post Sarbanes-Oxley
era. This approach compartmentalizes a director's duties. If a federal
requirement is on point, then the federal standard of liability will govern;
if no federal law applies, then the state common law governs. For example,
if a shareholder alleges that directors breached their duty of care in a
circumstance regarding audit committee requirements as mandated by
Sarbanes-Oxley section 301,50 then the officer's liability will be subject
to the higher standard articulated under that statute. Alternatively, if a
shareholder alleges that directors breached their duty of care while making
a strategic business decision, as in Van Gorkom,I s' the state court's
articulation of the standard will govern.
This solution achieves greater clarity of law and reduces the fiduciary
black hole created by two conflicting standards governing the same
situation. However, the solution does not completely eradicate the
problem. Inevitably, a court will face a situation that could arguably be
governed by both federal statute and traditional state common law. Each
factual circumstance is different, and compartmentalizing the standards
may be difficult when there is overlap. This defect is not fatal, though.
Over time, case-by-case judicial decisions will flush out the distinctions
in the same way courts clarify most legal tests. Our common law system
affords us that luxury.
To achieve this clarity, the Delaware Supreme Court should
specifically declare that the standard of care is not rising, but is the same
today as it was in Van Gorkom and Caremark.The Court should plainly
state that unless a federal directive specifically supersedes a state standard,
the state's common law will apply. This clarity will prevent the confusion
and fear that plagued the H-P Board. When a court must decide whether
a director failed to exercise proper oversight while ferreting out a

149. Id.
150. See supra text accompanying note 100.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
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boardroom leak, an issue not addressed by Sarbanes-Oxley or the
Sentencing Guidelines, the court should look to state common law.
Unfortunately, this solution has one serious drawback. Commentators
argue that Van Gorkom, Caremark, the Sentencing Guidelines, and
Sarbanes-Oxley produce standards of liability that force courts to focus on
process rather than substance. 51 2 In many of these circumstances, liability
will attach when the director did not ask enough questions, asked them too
late, or unreasonably relied on others' opinions. Directors escape liability
when they elevate form over substance to satisfy Caremarkand its related
fiduciary requirements. This argument contends that a process-based
standard produces compliance systems that emulate those of Enron and
Worldcom, both of which would have passed Caremark's failure to
monitor test.153 Caremark'sdesired outcome to produce a proper corporate
reporting system resulted in directors more concerned with satisfying the
"attempt," rather than assuring a proper reporting system actually worked.
A director's focus misguidedly centered on "liability avoidance" rather
than the correct goal of preventing corporate misconduct.' 54
This criticism is valid, but it does not outweigh the benefits that come
from the certainty in Delaware's corporate law. About 60% of Fortune 500
companies choose to incorporate in Delaware' because the state has clear
corporate laws developed in its sophisticated courtrooms. Public policy
decisions must sometimes sacrifice one worthy value for another. This
proposal to affirm the low Caremark standard of care is one of those
instances. Preferring form over substance is undesirable, but this value
choice is not unique to Delaware's corporate law history. The state has a
long record of preferring form over substance in order to ensure the

152. See Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In re Caremark: Good Intentions,
UnintendedConsequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 691, 692 (2004) ("Where [Caremark], and
the Guidelines, went off track was in their heavy emphasis on procedure rather than in an
individually based motivation for appropriate activity.").
153. Id. at 706.
154. Id. at 701. Elson and Gyves suggest an approach established by the National Association
of Corporate Directors' Council, which emphasized equity ownership and directorship independent
of management to set a positive ethical tone that would spread throughout the corporation. Id. at
692. This approach would undoubtedly provide better legal compliance systems within
corporations, but does not need to be mandated by fiduciary law. Shareholders have the power
through elections to hold their directors to any standard of care that they choose. It is a wellestablished principle that good corporate governance is a distinct concept from the law of corporate
fiduciary duties. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000). See also supra text
accompanying note 78.
155. State ofDelaware: Division ofCorporations, http://www.corp.delaware.gov/default.shtml
(last visited June 4, 2007)..
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certainty and clarity of its law. 5 6 That history applies mostly to statutory
interpretation, but the same policy judgment underlying those decisions
can be applied to the common law.
The Delaware Supreme Court recently took a giant leap in the right
direction when it decided Stone v. Ritter in November 2006.'17 In Stone,
the Delaware Supreme Court expressly adopted Caremark, but actually
lowered the standard of care required by directors. Shareholders in Stone
brought a classic Caremark derivative suit, alleging that the directors
breached their duty to monitor the corporation, which led to $50 million
in fines and penalties paid by the company.' 58 The Stone court traced the
history of oversight liability and expressly approved the Caremark
standard.'
When approving the standard, however, it actually
rearticulated a lower duty of care. A shareholder must now show that
directors "consciously disregard[ed]', 160 a duty and "knew that they were
not discharging their fiduciary obligations."' 6 ' This knowledge
requirement seems to eliminate liability in circumstances even when the
director "should have known"'162 of corporate wrongdoing. The Stone
decision is sure to supersede Caremark's role as the leading case in
oversight liability, 63 and that is a positive step forward in achieving
greater clarity in this post Sarbanes-Oxley era. The Delaware Supreme
Court should also revisit Van Gorkom, and if it does not lower the standard
as suggested by some Delaware judges,"6 it should at least keep it steady
to preclude a court from reviewing the substance of directors' business
decisions.

156. See Rauch v. RCA Corp., 861 F.2d 29, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1998) (providing a form over
substance interpretation of a Delaware statute); Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125
(Del. 1963) (noting that a failure to strictly follow the statute "would be to create uncertainty in the
law and invite litigation").
157. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006).
158. Id. at 364-65.
159. Id. at 369.
160. Id. at 370.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
163. The Stone decision is also significant for its shifting of oversight liability from the duty
of care to the duty of loyalty. The Stone court expressly rejected commentators' contention that
"good faith" is a distinct fiduciary duty, and instead held that a director's breach of the duty to
monitor establishes the necessaryconditionpredicate to liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty.
Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70 (emphasis added). This shift does not change any of the analysis in this
Note, but it is sure to spark an interesting academic debate.
164. Allen et al., supra note 78.
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VII. CONCLUSION

The vigorous pursuit of the KONA investigations may qualify as one
of those decisions that extended from "'stupid' to 'egregious," 6 5 but even
Caremark recognized that these actions provide no basis for director
liability.166 Under Caremark,and now Stone, the H-P directors must have
consciously disregarded their fiduciary duties to be found liable. If they
did nothing while the leaks continued, they would have been held liable
even under Stone's deferential standard. If facts reveal that Dunn and the
other directors deliberately stuck their heads in the sand, then they may be
liable for breaching their duty to monitor. However, Dunn sought legal
assurance from H-P's General Counsel and H-P's senior ethics attorney,
acts that do not support a finding of conscious disregard for her duties.
The media, fixated on the salacious details of spies and stings, grabbed
hold of the H-P story and propelled it to the front of the papers. The
detectives' practices were deplorable, and Congress recently took a
positive step forward in restricting the ability to "pretext."' 67 However,
stopping there puts a band-aid on a bullet wound. Murky "pretexting" laws
did not produce the H-P scandal; murky fiduciary laws did. State supreme
courts must clarify and compartmentalize directors' fiduciary duties.
Under the current state of law, Dunn is convinced she acted appropriately
but wishes that she used a more reputable private detective firm. 6' 8 In other
words, she would have done it again just-just more carefully. Such a
paranoid view from a director has no place in modem corporate
governance. H-P and the shareholders may ultimately settle out of court,
but that would be a shame. State courts should seize this opportunity to
plainly assert that, unless a federal directive is on point, the state standards

165. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
166. Id.A "stupid" decision provides no grounds for liability "so long as a court determines
that the process employed was either rational or done in a goodfaith effort to advance corporate
interests." Id.
167. Brad Stone & Matt Richtell, Senate Passes Bill to Criminalize Pretexting,N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 2006, at C8.
168. Anders & Murray, supranote 25, at Al. In her testimony before Congress, Dunn cites
a poll that found 85% of directors "place[d] a higher priority on corporate confidentiality than
shielding their personal information from prying eyes." Testimony, supra note 10, at 17. The same
study found that 50% of responding directors would have supported a "ruse" similar to the one
employed by H-P. Michael Liedtke, Survey FindsBoards Value CorporateSecrets Over Personal
Privacy, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 18, 2006, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=-/news/
archive/2006/09/18/state/n 154921 D60.DTL. To some extent, the overwhelming willingness by
directors to greatly value confidentiality over personal information likely stems from increased
legal pressure to account for every mishap that occurs within the company.
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will govern. Only then can state courts reaffirm their traditional role as the
adjudicators of corporate law.

